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 Prophets of Doom, Seers of Fortune: 
20 Years of Expert Evidence 
under the Oakes Test 
Robert E. Charney and S. Zachary Green* 
But Scientists, who ought to know, 
Assure us that it must be so ... 
Oh! let us never, never doubt 
What nobody is sure about! 
Hilaire Belloc 
 
Courts often have to make predictions on the basis of expert evidence. 
In tort cases courts rely on expert evidence to predict future economic 
loss, life expectancy and future care costs.1 In criminal cases, and 
particularly in dangerous offender applications, courts must consider 
expert predictions on the risk that the offender will re-offend.2 Courts 
recognize that such questions are “fraught with difficulty, for it is in 
large measure pure speculation”.3 Future events cannot be “proved” or 
“disproved” in the conventional sense that facts relating to past events 
can be. 
Accordingly, courts do not require that a plaintiff who seeks 
compensation for future pecuniary loss satisfy the traditional “balance 
of probabilities” standard. If the plaintiff establishes “a real and 
substantial risk” of future pecuniary loss, she is entitled to 
compensation. The amount of compensation will in turn depend on the 
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degree of risk established and the contingencies that might affect future 
earnings.4 
Similarly, expert evidence in Charter cases, and particularly 
evidence proffered in relation to Charter section 1, often involves 
prediction and speculation about the potential impact of a statute or 
government policy on future events. Experts in economics, sociology, 
political science, psychology and other disciplines where academics 
purport to have forensic expertise often provide the courts with 
competing opinion evidence in relation to the various elements of the 
Oakes5 test. 
A review of the courts’ decisions in relation to Charter section 1 
over the past 20 years reveals a number of examples where the courts 
have had to weigh conflicting expert predictions in various disciplines.6 
What would be the impact on sexual violence and other crimes against 
women and children if there were no laws regulating pornography?7 
What would be the effect on our pluralist society if all private religious 
schools received full funding?8 What would be the economic 
consequences of increasing welfare rates,9 or abolishing mandatory 
retirement?10 Do health warnings on cigarette packages really 
discourage smoking?11 And, most recently, will permitting private health 
insurance increase or decrease (or have no effect on) the availability of 
publicly funded health care resources?12 All of these are questions on 
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which the courts have received expert evidence under Charter section 1 
in order to determine whether an impugned law really furthered an 
important government objective or was rationally related to that 
objective. 
In the first 10 years after Oakes, the Supreme Court articulated a 
limited view of its role in choosing between conflicting expert evidence 
in disciplines such as economics. In our view, this course of restraint in 
the face of empirical uncertainty was wise. Even with the best evidence 
available, the economic and social consequences of many government 
policy decisions are not capable of prediction to any degree of certainty 
approaching probability. Take, for example, the potential impact of fully 
funding all private religious schools in Ontario’s pluralist society. In 
Adler, some experts predicted that such funding would lead to the 
gradual demise of the public school system and increased ethnic and 
religious segregation and intolerance that would result in the progressive 
Balkanization of society. Other experts predicted that full funding of 
private religious schools would promote the Canadian values of 
multiculturalism and religious freedom, and lead to greater understanding 
and respect for religious minorities, thereby strengthening pluralism and 
democracy. Each side pointed to other jurisdictions to support their 
opinion. The reality, however, is that such predictions cannot be proven 
in court; the only way to actually determine the impact of fully funding 
all private religious schools in Ontario would be to fully fund all private 
religious schools in Ontario, wait 30 or 40 years, and do a retrospective 
study. But public policy is made prospectively, not retrospectively, and 
in such matters educated guess-work is inevitable. 
Courts have no greater expertise than legislatures in choosing 
between competing economic or social scientific predictions, and where 
there is no demonstrably right answer to a policy question, judicial 
deference to the legislature is appropriate. In fact, a legislature is in a 
better position than a court to choose between competing economic or 
social scientific theories and the predictions that they generate. The 
litigation process is well designed to find adjudicative facts, but not so 
well designed to find legislative facts: that is, judicial fact-finding is 
tailored towards coming to conclusions about discrete past events from 
viva voce evidence, but is less suited to describing ongoing relationships 
and continuing policies — and less suited still to calculating the 
probable effect of hypothetical future policies — on the basis of 
statistical or economic evidence.  
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Courts assessing the continuing operation or future application of a 
government policy are inevitably asked to choose between two (or 
more) expert evidence reports. On what principled basis do courts prefer 
the predictions of one properly qualified expert to another? The 
principal mechanism for quality control in academic science is peer 
review, through which the theses of individuals are critically scrutinized 
for their credibility, cogency and significance by the community of 
experts.13 The judicial model of fact-finding, by contrast, is premised on 
a single authoritative fact-finder, whose informational inputs are the 
sworn assertions of particular experts chosen for their conformity to the 
pre-existing litigation position of the parties, and whatever concessions 
can be obtained from these experts on cross-examination by non-expert 
lawyers. As Manfredi and Maioni note:  
Adversarial fact-finding complicates matters further at the trial court 
level by presenting information in a manner that detracts from its 
comprehensiveness, quality, and integrity; that promotes unrealistic 
simplification; and that hinders the “logical order needed for a 
systematic consideration of findings on a specific topic”. At the 
appellate level, the adversarial nature of adjudication tends to 
exaggerate the authoritativeness of information and to encourage 
courts to treat hypotheses as axioms.14  
Judicial fact-finding is deficient in this respect when compared with 
governmental fact-finding, which may allow for more systematic 
assessment of polycentric issues through statistical and economic 
evidence, stakeholder input, and long-term financial and demographic 
planning. By contrast, judicial assessment of policy issues tends to 
suffer from what Greschner and Lewis call “telescopic vision”: 
litigation is focused on a single aspect of a particular statute or 
government program, with the effect that the single issue being litigated 
is magnified in importance, and all other considerations, competing 
interests, and claims for resources lose their focus.15 The institutional 
limitations of the judicial process mean that courts are focused on a 
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particular issue in isolation, and have only the evidence presented by the 
particular parties before them. In contrast, legislatures must consider 
each issue within a broader context and with the benefit of a greater 
number of sources of information.  
A number of cases in the 20 years since Oakes illustrate the 
Supreme Court’s recognition that it cannot finally resolve ongoing 
economic or social science debates through the judicial process, or make 
judicial “findings” about the potential outcomes of future legislative 
policy changes.  
I. THE LABOUR TRILOGY 
In 1987 the Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether 
freedom of association in Charter section 2(d) guaranteed a right to 
strike and a right to bargain collectively. In what has become known as 
the “Labour Trilogy”, the majority of the Supreme Court held that 
freedom of association did not guarantee either of those rights. What is 
significant is how the potential application of Charter section 1 to future 
cases influenced the Court’s interpretation of the rights at issue. The 
Court recognized that if the rights to strike and bargain collectively were 
guaranteed, the Court would then have the responsibility to reconsider 
all of the legislative decisions that limited those proposed rights, even 
though there “are no clearly correct answers to these questions”: 
The Court is called upon to determine, as a matter of constitutional 
law, which government services are essential and whether the 
alternative of arbitration is adequate compensation for the loss of a 
right to strike. In the PSAC case, the Court must decide whether mere 
postponement of collective bargaining is a reasonable limit, given the 
Government’s substantial interest in reducing inflation and the growth 
in government expenses. In the Dairy Workers case, the Court is asked 
to decide whether the harm caused to dairy farmers through a closure 
of the dairies is of sufficient importance to justify prohibiting strike 
action and lockouts. None of these issues is amenable to principled 
resolution. There are no clearly correct answers to these questions. 
They are of a nature peculiarly apposite to the functions of the 
Legislature. However, if the right to strike is found in the Charter, it 
will be the courts which time and time again will have to resolve these 
questions, relying only on the evidence and arguments presented by 
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the parties, despite the social implications of each decision. This is a 
legislative function into which the courts should not intrude.16 
The Dairy Workers case is a case in point.17 The case concerned 
Saskatchewan legislation that prohibited strikes and lockouts in the 
dairy industry. Had the majority concluded that there was a right to 
strike under Charter section 2(d), they would have been required to 
decide “whether the harm caused to dairy farmers through a closure of 
the dairies is of sufficient importance to justify prohibiting strike action 
and lockouts”.18 As in many of the early Charter cases where the case 
arose prior to the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Oakes, the evidence 
adduced at the hearing in 1984 was very limited, and appears to have 
consisted mainly of newspaper articles that both sides consented to 
admit. 
The majority’s concerns, however, would remain equally valid in 
the face of conflicting economic expert opinions that each side could, no 
doubt, have obtained. Whether any particular strike will, in the short or 
long run, be good or bad for a particular sector of the economy depends 
on a number of variables and future contingencies that necessarily 
transforms every expert opinion into speculation and prediction. That 
economic speculation and prediction will be based as much, and 
sometimes more, on economic theory and personal values as it is on 
facts or statistics. If one expert were to predict serious adverse 
consequences for the dairy industry, and a different expert were to 
predict that such consequences can be avoided (or that the strike will 
actually benefit the dairy industry in the long run), how could the Court 
choose between such predictions? The answer is that the Court should 
not choose between competing economic predictions, but should defer 
to the choice made by the legislature as long as credible expert evidence 
is tendered in support of that position. If economic predictions are to be 
made, the Court can ask no more than that the legislature establish “a 
real and substantial risk” that certain adverse consequences will occur. 
While the majority found it unnecessary to consider Charter section 
1, Dickson C.J.’s concurring opinion (he found an infringement of 
Charter section 2(d)) is consistent with this approach. On the basis of 
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[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 419-20. 
17
 R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 [hereinafter 
“Dairy Workers”]. 
18
 Id. 
(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 20 Years of Expert Evidence 485 
the information contained in the newspaper articles appended to the 
union’s affidavits, Dickson C.J. found that the “economic harm 
threatened by a total work stoppage in the dairy processing industry” 
justified the imposition of compulsory arbitration in the place of a right 
to strike notwithstanding the competing evidence/predictions filed by 
union officials.19 
Similarly, in the companion PSAC case,20 Dickson C.J., in a 
partially concurring opinion, was prepared to accept the expert opinion 
of “three of the four economists at trial” who agreed that inflation was a 
serious problem in 1982. More problematic was whether the imposition 
of compensation controls on a relatively small (5 per cent) proportion of 
the labour force was an “effective strategy for fighting inflation”. Again, 
Dickson C.J. counselled judicial caution in matters of economic policy: 
In my opinion, courts must exercise considerable caution when 
confronted with difficult questions of economic policy. It is not our 
judicial role to assess the effectiveness or wisdom of various 
government strategies for solving pressing economic problems. The 
question how best to combat inflation has perplexed economists for 
several generations. It would be highly undesirable for the courts to 
attempt to pronounce on the relative importance of various suggested 
causes of inflation, such as the expansion of the money supply, fiscal 
deficits, foreign inflation, or the built-in inflationary expectations of 
individual economic actors. A high degree of deference ought properly 
to be accorded to the government’s choice of strategy in combating 
this complex problem.21 
II. IRWIN TOY 
Similar cautions have been expressed in other cases where competing 
economic or social science evidence was tendered in court in relation to 
Charter section 1. For example, in Irwin Toy the Supreme Court was 
confronted with competing evidence regarding the susceptibility of 
young children to media manipulation and their ability to differentiate 
between reality and fiction.22 While the evidence was consistent with 
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regard to young children, the opinion evidence was more divided when 
children aged 6-13 were involved. Again, the Supreme Court confirmed 
that “courts are not called upon to substitute judicial opinions for 
legislative ones as to the place at which to draw a precise time”.23 It is 
the legislature, not the court, which should weigh and assess conflicting 
scientific evidence: 
The same can be said of evaluating competing credible scientific 
evidence and choosing thirteen, as opposed to ten or seven, as the 
upper age limit for the protected group here in issue. Where the 
legislature mediates between the competing claims of different groups 
in the community, it will inevitably be called upon to draw a line 
marking where one set of claims legitimately begins and the other 
fades away without access to complete knowledge as to its precise 
location. If the legislature has made a reasonable assessment as to 
where the line is most properly drawn, especially if that assessment 
involves weighing conflicting scientific evidence and allocating scarce 
resources on this basis, it is not for the court to second guess. That 
would only be to substitute one estimate for another.24 
This caution regarding conflicting scientific evidence was also 
raised in the context of the “minimal impairment” step of the Oakes test: 
Thus, in matching means to ends and asking whether rights or 
freedoms are impaired as little as possible, a legislature mediating 
between the claims of competing groups will be forced to strike a 
balance without the benefit of absolute certainty concerning how that 
balance is best struck. … 
When striking a balance between the claims of competing groups, the 
choice of means, like the choice of ends, frequently will require an 
assessment of conflicting scientific evidence and differing justified 
demands on scarce resources.25 
Finally, the Supreme Court confirmed that the issue for a court 
which is called upon to assess “competing social science evidence” is 
not to decide which social scientist is right, but to decide whether the 
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 Id., at 889, citing R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 
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legislature had, on the evidence tendered, a “reasonable basis”26 to make 
the policy choice it made: 
In the instant case, the Court is called upon to assess competing social 
science evidence respecting the appropriate means for addressing the 
problem of children’s advertising. The question is whether the 
government had a reasonable basis, on the evidence tendered, for 
concluding that the ban on all advertising directed at children impaired 
freedom of expression as little as possible given the government’s 
pressing and substantial objective.27 
An important issue in Irwin Toy was whether the government’s 
Charter section 1 case must be limited to the evidence that was before 
the legislature when it passed the legislation, or whether the Court 
should consider expert evidence and studies post-dating the enactment 
of the challenged legislation. The reality of today’s political world is 
that legislation is often passed without the benefit of a thorough 
scientific or expert analysis. Politicians often proceed on the basis of 
limited empirical evidence or even (what is to them) experience and 
common sense. Indeed, politicians are often criticized when the 
resolution of a pressing policy issue is delayed to permit more study or 
review. The Supreme Court in Irwin Toy concluded that the 
government’s case is not restricted to evidence contemporary with the 
adoption of the legislation, and that “the government surely can and 
should draw upon the best evidence currently available”.28 To proceed 
otherwise would turn the Charter analysis from a review of legislation to 
an inquiry into what the legislators themselves knew or understood 
when the legislation was passed.  
III. MCKINNEY 
McKinney dealt with the constitutional validity of the definition of “age” 
in the Ontario Human Rights Code29 that permitted mandatory 
retirement provisions in contracts of employment.30 Numerous experts in 
economics, industrial relations, social science and demographics 
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provided conflicting predictions on the potential impact of prohibiting 
mandatory retirement on industrial relations, hiring, training, dismissal, 
monitoring and evaluation, pensions, compensation, and youth 
employment. Once again the majority of the Court recognized that 
judges were not in a position to decide which set of expert predictions 
was correct: 
In undertaking this task, it is important again to remember that the 
ramifications of mandatory retirement on the organization of the 
workplace and its impact on society generally are not matters capable 
of precise measurement, and the effect of its removal by judicial fiat is 
even less certain. Decisions on such matters must inevitably be the 
product of a mix of conjecture, fragmentary knowledge, general 
experience and knowledge of the needs, aspirations and resources of 
society, and other components. They are decisions of a kind where 
those engaged in the political and legislative activities of Canadian 
democracy have evident advantages over members of the judicial 
branch, as Irwin Toy, supra, at p. 993-94, has reminded us. This does 
not absolve the judiciary of its constitutional obligation to scrutinize 
legislative action to ensure reasonable compliance with constitutional 
standards, but it does import greater circumspection than in areas such 
as the criminal justice system where the courts’ knowledge and 
understanding affords it a much higher degree of certainty.31 
The Supreme Court reiterated that the “operative question in these 
cases is whether the government had a reasonable basis, on the evidence 
tendered”, for its policy decision. Given the competing and conflicting 
economic predictions, it was reasonable for the legislature to opt for “a 
cautious approach to the matter”: 
The Legislature, like the Court, was faced with competing socio-
economic theories, about which respected academics not unnaturally 
differ. In my view, the Legislature is entitled to choose between them 
and surely to proceed cautiously in effecting change on such important 
issues of social and economic concern. On issues of this kind, where 
there is competing social science evidence, I have already discussed 
what Irwin Toy, supra, has told us about the stance the Court should 
take. In a word, the question for this Court is whether the government 
had a reasonable basis for concluding that the legislation impaired the 
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relevant right as little as possible given the government’s pressing and 
substantial objectives.32 
IV. BUTLER 
In Butler, the Charter section 1 analysis focused on the evidence that 
justified the prohibition on the distribution of obscene materials.33 Did 
the evidence “prove” that exposure to obscene materials resulted in 
“antisocial attitudinal changes” and make “degradation, humiliation, 
victimization, and violence in human relationships appear normal and 
acceptable”?34 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the social science 
literature on the causal relationship between pornography and the risk of 
harm to society “remains subject to controversy”.35 The Supreme Court 
reviewed the numerous published reports with inconsistent conclusions, 
and held that “a direct link between obscenity and harm to society may 
be difficult, if not impossible, to establish”. In the face of inconclusive 
social science evidence, the Supreme Court adopted the Irwin Toy 
standard of whether Parliament had a “reasonable basis” for its policy 
choice.36 In this context a “reasoned apprehension of harm” was 
sufficient to meet the Oakes test.  
V. RJR-MACDONALD 
The most extensive discussion of the issue of the role of the Court when 
confronted with conflicting social science evidence is found in RJR-
MacDonald, where the Supreme Court had to analyze the conflicting 
social science evidence relating to tobacco advertising and unattributed 
health warnings on tobacco products.37 
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) and La Forest J. agreed that an 
“overtechnical” approach to section 1 was to be avoided, and that the 
“proof to the standards required by science” was not required.38  
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To La Forest J., the scientific uncertainty regarding the causal 
connection between advertising and tobacco consumption and addiction 
did not preclude the government from prohibiting such advertising even 
if it limited freedom of expression. He described the causal connections 
as one of “the mysteries of human psychology. Many of the workings of 
the human mind, and the causes of human behaviour, remain hidden to 
our understanding and will no doubt remain so for quite some time”.39 In 
the face of a gap in scientific knowledge of the causes of tobacco 
consumption, a strict application of the Oakes analysis would: 
place an impossible onus on Parliament by requiring it to produce 
definitive social scientific evidence respecting the root causes of a 
pressing social concern every time it wishes to address its effects. This 
could have the effect of virtually paralyzing the operation of 
government in the socio-economic sphere…To require Parliament to 
wait for definitive social science conclusions every time it wishes to 
make social policy would impose an unjustifiable limit on legislative 
power by attributing a degree of scientific accuracy to the art of 
government which, in my view, is simply not consonant with reality.40 
If courts insist on “proof to the standards required by science”, 
legislatures will simply be unable to make any policy decision in areas 
where such decisions are based on forecasting the future or on imperfect 
scientific knowledge. And the reality is that all policy decisions with 
any relationship to economics involve some degree of forecasting. 
Justice La Forest adopted the following observations from LeBel 
J.A., who was then on the Quebec Court of Appeal: 
Interpreted literally, mechanically, without nuance, the Oakes test and 
the burden of proof which it imposes on the state would most often 
negate its ability to legislate. 
Moreover, such an approach misconceives the nature of a 
constitutional case such as this. It cannot be dealt with as if it were an 
ordinary civil trial. We are not dealing with a matter in which, for 
example, a particular litigant seeks to demonstrate that his tobacco 
consumption and the advertising of a manufacturer whose cigarettes 
he consumed caused his lung cancer or his emphysema. It is rather a 
question of determining the basis on which a legislator may choose to 
act, where the outcome is uncertain. 
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It is necessary to understand the limits and the nature of policy 
choices. It is often difficult to forecast the future and to anticipate the 
beneficial or negative consequences of government policy. A well-
conceived policy may be poorly applied. The necessary institutional 
resources may fail; unforeseen obstacles may intervene. If one is to 
apply rigorously the criterion of civil proof on the balance of 
probabilities it will be impossible to govern. On this basis, it would 
not be possible to make difficult but sometimes necessary legislative 
choices. There would be conferred on the courts a supervisory role 
over a state itself essentially inactive.41 
Accordingly, in the face of conflicting complex social science 
evidence, La Forest J. was of the view that a “high degree of judicial 
deference” was appropriate, and the Attorney General of Canada “need 
only demonstrate that Parliament had a rational basis for introducing the 
measures contained in the Act”.42 
Justice McLachlin agreed that courts must remain “sensitive to the 
social and political context of the impugned law and allow for 
difficulties of proof inherent in that context”, but she emphasized that 
there was a “bottom line” that courts must maintain to ensure that 
“before the state can override constitutional rights, there be a reasoned 
demonstration of the good which the law may achieve in relationship to 
the seriousness of the infringement”.43 While she agreed with La Forest 
J. that “proof to the standard required by science is not required” she 
insisted on maintaining “the civil standard of proof on a balance of 
probabilities at all stages of the proportionality analysis”. Justice 
McLachlin was careful to explain however, that “discharge of the civil 
standard does not require scientific demonstration; the balance of 
probabilities may be established by the application of common sense to 
what is known, even though what is known may be deficient from a 
scientific point of view”.44 Thus, in the case of legislation aimed at 
reducing tobacco consumption, where the legislation “is directed at 
changing human behaviour…the causal relationship may not be 
scientifically measurable”, and the Court may find a causal connection 
“on the basis of reason or logic”.45 
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While McLachlin J. was prepared to find a causal connection 
between certain forms of advertising, package warnings and 
consumption on the basis of reason, she was not able to see the 
connection “based on logic or reason” between the absolute prohibition 
on the use of a tobacco trade mark on articles other than tobacco 
products and tobacco consumption. 
Another issue that both La Forest J. and McLachlin J. commented 
upon was the question of appellate court deference to the fact finding of 
the trial judges. As a general proposition, it is a well established 
principle that an appellate court may only interfere with the factual 
findings of a trial judge where the trial judge made a manifest error and 
where the error influenced the trial judge’s final conclusion or overall 
appreciation of the evidence.46 Both La Forest J. and McLachlin J. (in a 
decision which foreshadows her later decision in the Chaoulli case) 
agreed that this principle applies to adjudicative facts, but will not apply 
with equal force to factual findings related to broad socio-economic 
facts and predictions upon which legislative policy decisions are usually 
made. Justice La Forest explained that: 
The privileged position of the trial judge does not extend to the 
assessment of “social” or “legislative” facts that arise in the law 
making process and require the legislature or a court to assess complex 
social science evidence and to draw general conclusions concerning 
the effect of legal rules on human behaviour… conclusions of this 
nature are most accurately characterized as social or legislative facts 
because they involve predictions about the social effects of legal rules, 
which are invariably subject to dispute.47 
With regard to the alleged causal connection between tobacco 
advertising and consumption, La Forest J. held that appellate court 
judges are as well placed as trial judges to make such findings. Indeed, 
if appellate courts were bound by trial court rulings regarding legislative 
facts, legislation that was valid in one province could be invalid in 
another province because of the trial judges’ disagreement regarding 
socio-economic facts and predictions, and trial judges could ignore 
Supreme Court precedent simply by making different factual 
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conclusions regarding the conflicting social-science evidence presented 
in the case before them. 
It is also clear from the balance of La Forest J.’s Charter section 1 
analysis that even if the traditional principle of appellate court deference 
to the trial judge’s factual findings did apply, he would have found that 
the trial judge had “disregarded a substantial amount of evidence that 
might otherwise have substantiated the government’s belief in a rational 
connection”,48 and had also asked himself the wrong question. The role 
of the trial judge was not to decide between two bodies of expert 
opinion on the connection between advertising and consumption, but 
whether the legislature had a reasonable basis for concluding that such a 
connection existed. 
Justice McLachlin shared La Forest J.’s general approach to this 
issue of deference to the trial judge’s finding, but recognized that the 
distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts may be hard to 
maintain in practice. Her conclusion on this point was: 
Suffice it to say that in the context of the s. 1 analysis, more deference 
may be required to findings based on evidence of a purely factual 
nature whereas a lesser degree of deference may be required where the 
trial judge has considered social science and other policy oriented 
evidence. As a general matter, appellate courts are not as constrained 
by the trial judge’s findings in the context of the s. 1 analysis as they 
are in the course of non-constitutional litigation, since the impact of 
the infringement on constitutional rights must often be assessed by 
reference to a broad review of social, economic and political factors in 
addition to scientific facts. At the same time, while appellate courts are 
not bound by the trial judge’s findings in respect of social science 
evidence, they should remain sensitive to the fact that the trial judge 
has had the advantage of hearing competing expert testimony 
firsthand. The trial judge’s findings with respect to the credibility of 
certain witnesses may be useful when the appeal court reviews the 
record.49 
VI. CHAOULLI 
We have seen that, in the first decade of reviewing expert evidence 
under Charter section 1, the Supreme Court articulated the deferential 
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principle that the legislature is entitled to choose from among competing 
expert opinions or predictions, even in the absence of demonstrable 
proof that its choice is the “right” one. In the main, the Supreme Court 
continued to apply this deferential principle throughout the second 
decade of Charter section 1 review, finding that Parliament was entitled, 
in the face of conflicting and inconclusive social science evidence, to 
prohibit the possession of child pornography50 and marijuana,51 and to 
place strict limits on the spending abilities of third parties during 
election periods,52 on the basis of a reasoned apprehension of harm.53  
Hogg has identified empirical or scientific uncertainty as one of a 
number of factors considered by the Supreme Court to warrant 
deference to the legislature: 
Among the considerations that are invoked by the Court in support of 
a degree of deference to the legislative choice are: where the law is 
designed to protect a vulnerable group (children, for example), where 
the law is premised on complex social-science evidence (about the 
effect of advertising, for example), where the law reconciles the 
interests of competing groups (mandatory retirement, for example) and 
where the law allocates scarce resources.54 
Having regard to Hogg’s list of considerations in support of judicial 
deference, a legal prognosticator (never more accurate than a social 
scientist or economist) would likely have predicted that Chaoulli v. 
Quebec constituted a perfect case for the Court to take a restrained 
approach to the expert evidence.55 Chaoulli concerned a challenge to 
provisions of Quebec’s health insurance statutes that prohibited the 
making of private contracts of insurance to cover the cost of services 
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paid for under the provincial plan.56 The purpose of this prohibition, as 
determined by the trial judge and accepted by a majority of the judges of 
the Supreme Court,57 was to prevent the establishment of a parallel 
private health insurance system that would compete with the public 
system for the finite health care resources that existed in the province. 
The claimants contended that the prohibition went beyond what was 
necessary to ensure the integrity of the public health insurance plan.58 
It is obvious that questions of the institutional design of a provincial 
health insurance plan involve all four of the considerations in favour of 
judicial deference identified by Hogg, just as it is obvious that such 
questions are deeply and essentially politically contested. As is the case 
with many policy questions, while there is no shortage of expert 
opinions based on competing economic theories, there is little consensus 
and no demonstrably correct answer. The claimants in Chaoulli relied 
on categorical expert opinion to the effect that the efficient provision of 
health care in Quebec “will only be reached after the government 
decides to introduce a health care system based on [private] contracting 
or reimbursement”, while the government’s expert opined in similarly 
unequivocal terms that “allowing private insurance to be available as an 
alternative to Medicare would have profound negative impacts on the 
public system rather than none as is assumed. It would not increase 
availability of services in the public sector or reduce waiting lists. 
Instead, it would divert resources from the publicly financed program to 
be available to private activities and it would increase total Canadian 
expenditures on health.”59 Both sides pointed to the experience in other 
jurisdictions as conclusive proof of the validity of their own contentions. 
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At the Supreme Court, all seven judges concluded that, at least in 
some circumstances, the statutory prohibition against buying private 
health insurance compromised the personal security of Quebec 
residents. The Court divided over whether the impugned provisions 
were justified by the need to preserve the public health insurance plan. 
Three judges (McLachlin C.J. and Major J., writing for themselves and 
Bastarache J.) held that the prohibition against contracting for private 
health insurance infringed Charter section 7 as well as section 1 of the 
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and that neither 
infringement was justified. Three judges (Binnie and LeBel JJ., writing 
for themselves and for Fish J.), found no infringement of Charter section 
7, because the prohibition was “directly related to Quebec’s interest in 
promoting a need-based system and in ensuring its viability and 
efficiency”,60 and found that the infringement of the Quebec Charter 
section 1 was justified. The seventh judge, Deschamps J., found an 
unjustified infringement of the Quebec Charter but did not consider the 
Canadian Charter. In the result, the impugned provisions were declared 
to be inconsistent with the Quebec Charter as an unjustified 
infringement of the right to personal security.  
Justice Deschamps was the only judge that dealt in detail with the 
issue of due deference,61 and she was clearly of the view that this was 
not an appropriate case to show deference to the legislature’s choice. 
Indeed, her reasons evince a certain impatience with the protracted 
debate among policy-makers, elected legislators and the public 
regarding the merits and efficacy of single-payer public health 
insurance: she noted what she viewed as “the tendency to focus the 
debate on a sociopolitical philosophy” rather than on “the urgency of 
taking concrete action”, and held that the government’s inertia or 
“failure to act” could not be used to justify judicial deference.62  
Inverting the earlier authority that elected legislators, not courts, are 
best positioned to assess complex social scientific evidence and to come 
to a reasoned apprehension of the harm that legislation is intended to 
address, Deschamps J. instead praised the superiority of courts in 
coming to conclusions about the efficacy of public health care. Courts 
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make decisions “on legal principles and not on a socio-political 
discourse that is disconnected from reality”.63 Unlike the “emotional” 
participants in public debate, courts are able to take a step back and 
consider the various positions objectively.64 Courts can consider 
evidence concerning the historical, social and economic aspects of 
health insurance policy, or any other evidence that may be material.65 
Courts “have a duty to rise above political debate”.66 
Similarly, McLachlin C.J. and Major J. took a dim view of the 
government’s reliance on the policy analysis and recommendations 
found in reports such as the Romanow Commission Report and the 
Kirby Committee Report, noting that “the import of these reports, which 
differ in many of their conclusions, is a matter of some debate”.67 
Whereas the earlier cases (reviewed above) had held that governments 
are entitled to more deference when they make policy choices 
concerning conflicting or debatable social science evidence, McLachlin 
C.J. and Major J. held that the conclusions of “other bodies on other 
material” could not displace the Court’s ability to come to its own 
conclusions on the evidence before it. 
This effusive praise for the superior ability of courts to reach 
objective and evidence-based conclusions on issues of health policy 
might have been more persuasive but for the fact that the trial judge who 
heard the expert evidence came to the opposite conclusion on the 
substantive issue in the case: 
La preuve a montré que le droit d’avoir recours à un système parallèle 
privé de soins, invoque par les requérants, aurait des répercussions sur 
les droits de l’ensemble de la population. Il ne faut pas jouer à 
l’autruche. L’établissement d’un système de santé parallèle privé 
aurait pour effet de menacer l’intégrité, le bon fonctionnement ainsi 
que la viabilité du système public. Les articles…empêchent cette 
éventualité et garantissent l’existence d’un système de santé public de 
qualité au Québec.68 
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This finding was affirmed by Forget J.A. at the Quebec Court of 
Appeal and by the dissenting judges at the Supreme Court.69  
It is not surprising that the judges disagreed with one another about 
the probable future effects of expanding private health insurance in 
Quebec. After all, the expert witnesses in Chaoulli disagreed among 
themselves as to the likely impact that removing the prohibition on 
private insurance would have on the public plan. The comprehensive 
public health care reform studies produced by the Romanow 
Commission70 and the Kirby Committee71 made only equivocal 
predictions of the effect of parallel private systems on public health 
care. Indeed, legislators, professionals and members of the public 
frequently disagree among themselves on these same issues. It is 
therefore to be expected that judges, like other reasonable and well-
informed people, will not all be of the same view with respect to such 
confounding questions. 
More perplexing is the question of why the court felt it ought to 
determine the issue at all. As Choudhry has commented: 
It would have been more honest for both the majority and dissenting 
judges to acknowledge that public policy in this area is based on 
approximations and extrapolations from the available evidence, 
inferences from comparative data, and, on occasion, educated guesses. 
Absent a large-scale policy experiment, this is all the evidence that is 
likely to be available.72 
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The proper question for the Supreme Court, consistent with its 
earlier decisions in areas of empirical uncertainty and competing expert 
opinion, was whether the impugned legislation responded to the 
legislature’s reasoned apprehension of harm. The government’s 
evidence was more than sufficient to meet that standard. Yet neither 
McLachlin C.J. and Major J. nor the dissenting judges adverted to the 
Court’s own precedents for deference in the face of conflicting social 
science evidence, as articulated in Irwin Toy, Butler and RJR-
MacDonald. Instead, the judges disagreed with each other at the level of 
policy as to whether the removal of the prohibition on private insurance 
would or would not adversely affect Quebec’s public health insurance 
plan in the future.  
Given the potential consequences that might result from tinkering 
with a multi-billion dollar social program that provides services to 
literally millions of Quebeckers, judicial restraint surely would have 
been preferable. Health care is at the very centre of policy-making in the 
provinces, and questions about its provision tend to dominate political 
discourse: “these are the issues upon which elections are won and 
lost.”73 Public health insurance is not an issue at the margins of public 
policy; on the contrary, it is heavily politically contested and 
inextricably related to questions of distributive justice, economic 
planning, taxation levels, and fiscal sustainability. All of these questions 
call for trade-offs and compromises made on the basis of incomplete 
knowledge, interjurisdictional comparisons, and best guesses. As the 
Supreme Court itself noted in Irwin Toy, democratic institutions are 
meant to let us all share in the responsibility for these difficult choices.74 
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